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PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES: THE COURTS AND THE
STATE ACTION THEORIES
Public educational institutions, as agencies of state and local govern-
ment, are subject to the substantive and procedural limitations which
delimit government conduct generally.' Private educational facilities, on
the other hand, have not been required to meet such constitutional stan-
dards, as is indicated by cases arising out of the student protest movement
of the past decade which involved due process challenges to the discipli-
nary procedures of private schools and universities.' Most of the recent
3
'Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Wright v. Texas So. Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th
Cir. 1968); Dixon v. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Knight v. State
Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
2Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Palacios v. Foltz, 441 F.2d
1196 (10th Cir. 1971); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Powe v. Miles,
407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Morgan v. St. Francis Prep. School, 326 F. Supp. 1152 (M.D.
Pa. 1971); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), affd, 439 F.2d 412
(7th Cir. 1971); Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, 439
F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1971); McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970);
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Greene v.
Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd in part on other grounds, dismissed
in part as moot, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Only two courts have stated that no distinction should be made between public and
private universities; one court was reversed and the other offered its statement as a passing
remark. In Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.),
judgment vacated and new trial ordered, 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La.), affd per curiam, 306
F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), rev'd on retrial, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962), Judge J. Skelly
Wright wrote that "[n]o one any longer doubts that education is a matter affected with the
greatest public interest. . . . this is true whether it is offered by a public or private institu-
tion." 203 F. Supp. at 858-59. In Healy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 40 U.S. L.W. 3264 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1971) (No. 452), involving an action by state
college students for declaratory relief to gain the college's approval of the local S.D.S.
chapter as a recognized campus association, the court noted: "we yield to none in our
profound belief that the full panoply of constitutional rights, duties, privileges and immuni-
ties should be fully implemented on every campus, whether of a public or private college
.... .445 F.2d at 1130.
3Historically, the courts have utilized two doctrines to restrict the procedural protec-
tions provided by law to private university students. Some courts rely on the doctrine of in
loco parentis which is based on the notion that the university could act in place of the parent.
See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924). Other courts cite
a contractual theory which states that the student has knowingly entered a contract with
the university and the university is required to provide only so much protection as is en-
forceable under the contract. See, e.g., Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435
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fourteenth amendment challenges to private conduct have been brought
in federal courts as civil actions under section 1983 of Title 42.1 To be
successful in an action under 1983, a plaintiff must establish not only that
he has been deprived of a federally created right, but also that the defen-
dant "acted under color of state law."5 Itis this latter requirement, which
is synonomous with "state action"' as that concept has been developed
under the language of the fourteenth amendment,7 that is the major obsta-
cle to the application of due process to the disciplinary systems of private-
(1928). Heavy criticism has been dealt to both theories. See Holland, The Student and the
Law, 22 CURRENT LEG. PROB. 61, 66 (1969); Note, The College Student and Due Process
in Disciplinary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REV. 87, 88-90 (1968); Comment, Private Govern-
ment on the Campus-Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1367-
77 (1963) [hereinafter Judicial Review]. Despite the criticism, the theories have retained
some vitality even after public institutions were required to afford due process to their
students. See, e.g., Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, affd
mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962). For an interesting non-
constitutional approach to the protection of students from the university's disciplinary
power see Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory,
54 KY. L.J. 643 (1966).
'42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983 was originally enacted as Act of April 20,
1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. For a concise discussion of the legislative history of section
1983 see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 277, 279-82 (1965). See Note, Damages Under § 1983: The School Context,
46 IND. L.J. 521 (1971), stating:
In its present form, § 1983 has become increasingly used in the school
context to coerce officials who have failed or refused to recognize that
constitutional guarantees extend to teachers and students. In ef-
fect, § 1983 has begun a process of judicialization of schools, extending
concepts of due process and equal protection into an area where arbitrary
action by officials has been historically accepted.
Id.
542 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Federal courts have jurisdiction in section 1983 actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (3) & (4)
(1970).
'United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
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universities.8 Courts are reluctant to find state action in the context of
private education so as to afford students at private universities proce-
dural safeguards similar to those afforded students at public institutions.
Robinson v. Davis
This judicial reluctance was recently exhibited by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Robinson v. Davis.' In Robinson, an action under
section 1983 was brought by a student at Montreat-Anderson College in
Montreat, North Carolina, alleging constitutional violations in his expul-
sion following an investigatory hearing on drug usage at the college. The
investigation was instigated by reports received by a town police officer
from the State Bureau of Investigation and anonymous student inform-
ers. The college's administrative committee ordered town police officers,
who were also employed as security guards by the college, 10 to summon
selected students to a closed hearing. Plaintiff's presence was preempto-
rily requested by one of the defendants dressed in a Montreat police
uniform and carrying a side arm. The students were neither given notice
of the charges nor an opportunity to know of the evidence against them
or to present evidence on their own behalf." A major portion of the
interrogation was conducted by one of the police officer-security guards.
Plaintiff alleged that he had been deprived of federally-created rights and
presented two constitutional issues: whether the procedures used by the
college to request his presence at the hearing amounted to a "seizure"
proscribed by the fourth amendment and whether the conduct of the
hearing failed to provide "due process" as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.'
'If no state action can be proven, federal jurisdiction will be lacking and the merits of
the due process or equal protection claim will not be reached. See, e.g., Robinson v. Davis,
447 F.2d 753, 759 (4th Cir. 1971).
'447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1971).
11Id. at 754. Plaintiff's argument that the police-security guards' participation in the
event constituted state action was based on the holding of Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
130 (1964), which proscribed a sheriffs conduct as being "under color of state law." Brief
for appellant at I1. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the four policemen were
acting within the ambit of their private employment as security guards. This conclusion
disregards Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943), a case involving a sheriff
who participated in the physical abuse of Jehovah's Witnesses. Although the sheriff claimed
to have stated at that time that he was not acting under the name of the law (a position
similar to that taken by the defendant policemen in Robinson), his conduct was nevertheless
punishable under the fourteenth amendment. The Fourth Circuit stated that an officer of
the law cannot so lightly "shuffle off" his official role. 132 F.2d at 906.
"447 F.2d at 760-61 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
'21d. at 760. Judge Butzner, in dissent, concluded that the plaintiff was denied due
process in the conduct of the administrative hearing.
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State action, the other foundational requirement for an action under
section 1983, was alleged by the plaintiff in Robinson to be found in the
relationship between the college and the town of Montreat. The Presby-
terian Church of the South owns and operates not only the college, but
also the Mountain Retreat Association, which together occupy the major
portion of the land which comprises the incorporated town of Montreat.
Tax exempt status is given the property owned by the two organizations,
with the consequence that the town has insufficient resources to finance
any municipal services. However, the town has a contract with the Asso-
ciation pursuant to which the Association provides municipal services in
exchange for ninety-five percent of the town's small tax levy as partial
compensation. An interlocking directorate of sorts provides services for
and has control over the college, the town, and the Association.' Plain-
tiff alleged that state action was present due to the interdependence of
the college and the town and that the action of town police officers in the
investigation involved the town directly in the injurious conduct. Yet the
Fourth Circuit, reaching a decision generally consistent withthe position
of other federal courts,'5 concluded that no state action was present.
Robinson reinforces the long-standing distinction, initially stated by
Chief Justice Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,"6
differentiating public from private educational corporations. Numerous
writers have criticized this distinction as incorrectly reflecting the realities
of modern education. For several years, they have predicted that as uni-
versity education becomes more necessary and as private universities
become more dependent upon government support for their survival, the
courts will bring the actions of private universities and colleges within the
scope of the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. 7
'31d. at 754.
"Brief for appellant at 11, 14.
"See cases cited in note 2 supra.
1617 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). In holding unconstitutional an act of the New Hamp-
shire legislature which altered the Dartmouth charter, Marshall drew a distinction between
"a civil institution to be employed in the administration of government" and "a private
eleemosynary institution." Id. at 640-41. See O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law,
19 BUFF. L. REv. 155, 156-61 (1970), for a criticism of Marshall's Dartmouth College
opinion and the assumptions on which it rested. That such a public-private distinction may
be unreasonable in the due process context is illustrated by the fact that a student's desire
to attend a private college would require him to forfeit constitutional rights which he would
possess were he to enter a state university. But see H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COL-
LEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA 12 (1968) [hereinafter FRIENDLY], which
suggests that a great contribution of the Dartmouth College case was "the impetus it gave
to voluntary associations as a factor in American life."
"See, e.g., Note, An Overview: The Private University and Due Process, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 795, 806; Note, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private
Universities, 5 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 277, 287-88 (1969); Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably
19721
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Suggested Theories for Finding State Action
The commentators argue that various Supreme Court discussions of
the state action concept provide a foundation for the application of con-
stitutional standards to the disciplinary proceedings of most, if not all,
private universities.' From these discussions emerge three applicable
theories: (1) that state action may be discovered in the control exercised
by the state over the private university through regulation and financial
aid; (2) that state action may be deemed present by the very nature of
education and of the university itself as a "public function;" and (3) that
state action may be found by considering all the "indicia" of state
involvement."
A. The State Control Theory
The state control theory urges the courts to view such factors as state
authorization to grant degrees, incorporation of or chartering of the uni-
versity by the state, financial assistance in the form of grants and loans,
and tax exemptions 2 as infusing the state with sufficient control over the
private university so as to make the university's action state action.2 '
However, the courts have pointed out the invalidity of this approach. In
Enforced-Guidelines for University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L. REV. 301, 309
(1968); Johnson, The Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 344, 349
(1964); Judicial Review, supra note 3, at 1386; Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
COLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1102-03 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Lewis]. For example, it was
suggested in 1968 that "very few colleges are today wholly 'private' in the sense of being
altogether immune to the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights." Van Alstyne, The
Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 290, 291 (1968).
"Note, An Overview: The Private University and Due Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795,
797-803; Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1056-60
(1968); Kutner, Habeas Scholastica: An Ombudsman for Academic Due Process-A
Proposal, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107, 152 (1968).
"See note 18 supra. See also O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFF.
L. REv. 155 (1970).
"°For a comprehensive discussion of the methods of government control over and
financial aid to private universities see Judicial Review, supra note 3, at 1383-85.
2 This approach uses as its rationale the language in Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library,
149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945), and Griffin v. State Board of
Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965). In Kerr, the library system had been established
by private donation in 1882, but by 1944 ninety-nine percent of its budget was supplied by
city taxation and a high degree of budgetary control was available to the city government.
Because of this "state action," the Fourth Circuit compelled the library trustees to discon-
tinue discrimination in admittance to library training courses. But see Mitchell v. Boys Club
of Metrop. Police, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957). Griffin dealt with "white-only" private
schools which received generous state monetary aid. The court held that "if the private
school is the creature of, or is preponderantly maintained by, the grants, then the operation
of the school is State action .... " 239 F. Supp. at 565.
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Powe v. Miles,22 the Second Circuit found unpersuasive the argument that
New York State's general regulation of educational standards in private
colleges makes the colleges' acts in disciplining students the acts of the
state, for "the state must be involved not simply with some activity of
the institution alleged to have inflicted injury . . . but with the activity
that caused the injury."'-3
Nor has the contention been deemed valid that a state, through incor-
poration or chartering, gives approval to a school whose policies violate
the fourteenth amendment. This judicial rejection is bottomed on the
distinction between public and private educational corporations 2' first
asserted in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.2 In addition
to falling within the debatable Dartmough College distinction, 6 the incor-
poration argument is further weakened by the fact that no charter is
actually needed to operate a school, for there is a constitutionally pro-
tected right to coxiduct an educational institution.2 Finding state action
in the act of incorporation seems to include too many private activities.
For example, under such an approach, state action could be found in the
licensing of private individuals, thus bringing their conduct within four-
teenth amendment standards.
That financial aid in the form of state loans and grants is insufficient
to establish state action was clearly pointed out in Grossner v. Trustees-
of Columbia University,2 the court holding that "[the] receipt of money
from the State is not, without a good deal more, enough to make the
22407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
2Id. at 81. She also FRIENDLY, supra note 16, at 23. The court did note, however, that
state action would be present if the state had undertaken to set policy for control of
demonstrations in all universities. 407 F.2d at 81. Two years after Powe, the Second Circuit
was presented with a case involving the expulsion of students under rules adopted by a
college after the enactment of N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 6450 (McKinney Supp.. 1971), which
reads in part: "[Elvery college chartered by the regents . . . shall adopt rules and regula-
tions for the maintenance of public order on college campuses. ... The case was re-
manded for the district court to determine if the statute was a legislative attempt to "coerce
colleges" to adopt hard-line attitudes. Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir.
1970).
"See, e.g., Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 679 (E.D.
La. 1962). See also Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968).
217 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The fact that the state acted in chartering Dartmouth
did not make it a public institution, for the trustees and professors were not "invested with
any portion of political power, partaking in any degree in the administration of civil govern-
ment, [or] performing duties which flow from the sovereign authority." Id. at 633.
21See note 16 supra.
"Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional an Oregon law requiring children to be sent to public schools.
23287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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recipient an agency ... of the Government."' 21 In other words, something
other than mere financial aid from the state must be the determinative
factor. While financial aid may indicate state involvement with the uni-
versity, it must be established that the involvement concerns not the
general operation of the institution but rather the particular conduct that
is allegedly unconstitutional."° Another facet of the state control argu-
ment is the availability of tax benefits to private universities, such benefits
being viewed as an affirmative act on the part of the state legislature and
thus state action. However, tax benefits are conferred on nearly all col-
leges31 and are consequently available on a neutral basis, making it
unlikely that exemptions can be used by the state as a lever of influence.
32
For this reason, the courts have rejected the exemption argument as an
insufficient basis for a finding of state action.3 3 Assertions of state
control will continually fail to impress the courts unless a significant
connection can be established between the state aid or regulation and the
allegedly unconstitutional conduct of the private universities.
B. The Public Function Theory
The second approach, the "public function" theory, is predicated
upon two distinct but related concepts,3 4 either of which may support a
finding of state action. One concept is that the private university has
assumed an educational responsibility which in reality rests with the
state,3 while the related concept rests on the proposition that private
universities possess quasi-governmental powers and should thus be sub-
2 1d. at 547-48.
"See 287 F. Supp. at 548. See also Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 123 (6th
Cir. 1971); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968).31See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3), which exempts from corporate
taxation any corporation organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes.
32Lewis, note 17 supra, at 1107-08.
"See, e.g., Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1969); McLeod v. College
of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D.N.M. 1970). Tax exemptions have been held not to
constitute state "participation" in the conduct of other enterprises as well. Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, AFL-CIO v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470, 477 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
mThis distinction is recognized not only by the commentators but also by courts which
have dealt with "public function" arguments. See United States v. Wiseman, 445 F.2d 792,
795-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 346 (1971); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir.
1968).
"The theoretical basis for this facet of the "public function" theory is found in two
of the Texas white-primary cases, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), and in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), a case dealing
with a city's transfer of a segregated park from public to private control.
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jected to constitutional restraints.36 Like the state aid and regulation
argument, the public function theory has also been deemed an insufficient
basis for the extension of the due process guarantee to private universities.
The branch of the theory grounded upon the reasoning that private
universities are performing an educational function in place of the state
is predicated on the assumption that, if the private institutions were to
close, the government would have to fill the void." Only Judge J. Skelly
Wright, in an opinion which was reversed, 38 has accepted this argument.
He wrote:
Clearly, the administrators of a private college are performing a
public function. They do the work of the state, often in place of
the state. Does it not follow that they stand in the state's shoes?
And, if so, are they not then agents of the state, subject to the
constitutional restraints on governmental action... ?19
However, education has been traditionally regarded by the courts as an
area of private as well as of public activity. The concept that private
education serves a public function has been rejected in areas not involving
fourteenth amendment issues" as well as in cases dealing with due process
questions in the private university setting.4 Such rejection no doubt stems
from the judiciary's realization that applying the "public function"
concept to private education is an ad hoc approach and would have
monumental repercussions in matters outside the private university situa-
3This branch of the "public function" theory is based upon the notion that a private
university performs public functions for its residents, and for the public at large, in much
the same manner as a municipal corporation, and the mere fact that title rests in private
persons does not preclude a finding of state action. See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
3Judicial Review, supra note 3, at 1385 n. 126.
"Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), judgment
vacated and new trial ordered, 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La.), affd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489
(5th Cir.), rev'd on retrial, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
11203 F. Supp. at 859.
"Board of Educ. v. Pace College, 27 App. Div. 2d 87, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1966). The
court stated that while a private university may perform services of critical public interest,
such performance does not give it the character of a public function. Id. at 166. See
Application of Thomas S. Clarkson Mem. College of Tech., 274 App. Div. 732, 87
N.Y.S.2d 491 (1949) (holding that tax privileges are not quid pro quo for the performance
of a public function). Contra, Yale Univ. v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 42 A. 87 (1899).
"Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1971); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d
73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968); Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598, 606 (D.S.C. 1970),
affid, 439 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1971); McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498, 501
(D.N.M. 1970); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). In Grossner, the court flatly stated that "nothing supports the thesis that university
(or private elementary) 'education' as such is 'state action.'" 287 F. Supp. at 549.
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tion.42 Making all activities affected with public interest subject to the
fourteenth amendment would entail a drastic change in existing law.
The second but distinct concept of the "public function" theory is
grounded on the notion that a private university, because it performs
public functions for its students in much the same manner as a municipal
corporation provides for its residents, should be subjected to constitu-
tional restraints. Proponents of the theory have drawn an analogy to the
company town in Marsh v. Alabama43 or the shopping center in Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.44 However, the courts,
when presented with this argument, have consistently maintained that it
is the state itself and not the company town that is to be subjected to
constitutional restraints. s What was found unconstitutional in Marsh was
apparently the state's support of the town's action through the trespass
conviction. However, it can be argued that a state which permits this kind
of private action must couple the permission with certain restrictions
which, if not supplied by the states, will be supplied under the fourteenth
amendment by the courts.46 Yet those restrictions which emerged in
Marsh and Logan Valley Plaza have been narrowly interlireted by the
courts as dealing only with the designation of public places for first
amendment purposes rather than with violations of constitutional rights
in the internal affairs of such enterprises.47 The Fourth Circuit in
Robinson summarily dismissed Marsh and Logan Valley Plaza as inappl-
icable by stating that "[tlhe teaching of the cases in this area is clear,
obviating the necessity for further discussion."48
12For example, if the "education as a public function" argument is applied to all private
universities, a religious school would be performing the public task of education and conse-
quently be in violation of the "establishment of religion" clause of the first amendment.
See generally Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 n.10, (2d Cir. 1971);
FRIENDLY, supra note 16, at 24.
-326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under an
Alabama criminal trespass statute of a Jehovah's Witness who had distributed literature
on a street of a company-owned town, pointing out that a company-owned town did not
function differently from any other town and, with the presence of state action, could not
preclude the exercise of a pamphleteer's constitutional rights.
"'391 U.S. 308 (1968). Logan Valley Plaza enjoined a shopping center from using state
trespass laws to preclude picketing on its property. The Court stated that after Marsh
privately owned property may in some circumstances, at least for first amendment purposes,
be treated as though it were publicly held.
"Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"Lewis, supra note 17, at 1097.
4 Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1969). See also Lefcourt v. Legal
Aid Soc'y, 445 F.2d 1150, 1156 (2d Cir. 1971); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir.
1968).
11447 F.2d 753, 757 (4th Cir. 1971).
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C. The "Indicia" or Burton" Approach
The "indicia" concept of state action, as enunciated in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority,"0 urges courts to give a cumulative effect
to all the "indicia" of state involvement in order to discover the presence
of state action on the private campus.' In comparison to the state control
and "public function" arguments, the Burton approach seems to be the
strongest theory on which to base a finding of state action in the private
university context. Yet, use of Burton allows the courts, where a finding
of state action is or may be unavoidable, to view such involvement, after
weighing all the indicia, as not significant. That this escape valve exists
is due to the confusion over the meaning of state action generally and the
application of the Burton test in particular.
The Supreme Court expanded thestate action concept in the nineteen-
forties, moving from its earlier and rather rigid characterization52 to a
position proscribing conduct which under the earlier characterization was
arguably private.53 While the results in those cases were clear, the extent
to which other ostensibly private conduct would be proscribed was rela-
tively obscure. By 1960, the only certainty in this area of constitutional
law was provided by the fact that the concept could be said to have grown
in four directions" covering: the individual acting under color of law,5"
the non-official individual or group acting under governmental author-
ity,5" governmental refusal or failure to act,5" and judicial enforcement
42365 U.S. 715 (1961).
5Id.
5 Support for the "indicia" approach is found in the "sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances" language of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
The Court in Burton acknowledged that there is no set state action test for cases dealing
with non-obvious state involvement.
5 The character of state action was first determined by the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883), in which the Supreme Court held that the states rather than the federal government
were responsible for the protection of individual rights against infringement by private
individuals. Id. at 11. From the language of the Civil Rights Cases evolved a rigid character-
ization of state action which "postulated an active, direct role by the state." Note, The
Emasculation of Reitman v. Mulkey, 3 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 155, 156 (1971).
OShelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (extending the concept to judicial enforcement
of racially restrictive covenants); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (equating "under pretense of law" with "under color of law");
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (extending the concept to include Democratic
primaries in Texas).
-"Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347, 351-52 (1963).
wSee. e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91(1945).
"'See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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and supervision of private relationships. 8 But these classifications, which
arose in situations of rather conspicuous state involvement, were of little
aid to courts saddled with the responsibility of adjudicating cases of
nonobvious involvement on the basis of the Court's concept of the distinc-
tion between state and private action.
The distinction between state and private action would have been
virtually eliminated had the Court in later cases broadly interpreted the
implications of Shelley v. Kraemer,59 a case in which the Court found
state action in the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive real estate
covenants. A broad reading of Shelley would result in the conversion of
nearly all private decisions into state action. 0 However, the Court seem-
ingly rejected such an interpretation of Shelley out of a desire, perhaps,
to retain the state-private distinction. In Burton"' the Court placed a
limitation on a literal interpretation of Shelley by intimating that the
discovery of some nexus of the state with the private conduct is not
sufficient to bring such conduct within the concept of state action; 2 rather
the state must be involved to some "significant extent. 6 13 Burton in-
volved a restaurant, leased to a private individual by the state parking
authority, which refused to serve blacks. The Court initially observed that
the fourteenth amendment erects no shield against merely private con-
duct, however discriminatory or wrongful, "unless to some significant
extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have
become involved in it."64 Recognizing that the delineation of state from
private conduct through the application of a precise formula was impossi-
ble, the Court stated that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
be attributed its true significance." 5 The Court proceeded to look at the
5 See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
"See, e.g., Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
51334 U.S. 1 (1948).
"It has been argued that Shelley stands for the proposition that state action occurs
whenever a state gives effect to, or fails to provide a remedy against, a private restriction
of a fourteenth amendment right. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised
Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962). The author recognizes the confusion created by
Shelley and observes that the case was "rightly decided" but that "a more satisfactory
opinion can be written." Id. at 474.
61365 U.S. 715 (1961).
'11d. at 722.
111d. The court's "significant extent" language in Burton has been criticized for failing
to provide proper guidance to the bar and the public. Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1961).
8365 U.S. at 722.
MId.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
leasing and financial arrangements between the state agency and its
discriminatory lessee and, from those indicia, concluded that the state
was was involved to such a significant extent that action by the lessee was
action by the state.
While it is far easier to "fault 'state action' than to suggest a flawless
alternative standard,"6 the theory can nevertheless be described as "a
conceptual disaster area." 7 It is clear in Burton that the Court realized
the vagueness of the doctrine;68 perhaps Burton laid a foundation for
relinquishment of the concept. In any case, Burton can be said to have
taken the middle course between choosing a formula "in the hope of
achieving uniform and predictable results" and abandoning courts "to a
continual struggle with unruly legislative facts,"6 for the Burton Court
announced its decision by way of a "significant extent" formula, although
it reached its conclusion through the struggle of "sifting facts and weigh-
ing circumstances." Such a middle-ground policy has been criticized as
being "easy only in the short run." Robinson, by utilizing the Burton
approach to negate a finding of state action, gives validity to that criti-
cism.2 While Burton directed itself to situations in which state involve-
ment was so unobvious from the outset that examination must proceed
by sifting and weighing facts and circumstances, the case has been misin-
terpreted as supplying the sole state action formula to the exclusion of
the other directions in which the concept has moved.
In Robinson the Fourth Circuit utilized the Burton test 73 in a situa-
tion which arguably presented a higher degree of state involvement than
was discernible from the facts of Burton itself. Rather than applying
Burton in the one private university case to which the quasi-governmental
branch of the "public function" theory seems applicable, the court might
have extended the rationale of Marsh v. Alabama74 in order to reach the
merits of the student's claim. Marsh can be said to imply that private
organizations should be subject to constitutional restraints when they
have the power to infringe constitutional rights in a manner similar to
that of the state. Clearly the administrators of Montreat-Anderson Col-
"Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the State Action Limit on the Equal
Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 870 (1966).
"Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14,
81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
0365 U.S. at 722.
"Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 58 (1961).
70365 U.S. at 722.
7 Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 69.
"See, e.g., Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1971); Guillory v. Administrators
of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
n447 F.2d at 754.
74326 U.S. 501 (1945). See note 48 and text accompanying note 53 supra.
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lege vested themselves "with the cloak of municipal authority," in which
case "they act not only as private citizens, but also as agents of the
state."7 5 Alternatively, it can be argued that the branch of the state action
concept which covers the individual acting "under color of law"7 could
have been utilized by the Fourth Circuit to find the policemen's acts in
violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. That the Burton test, which
by its own admission is to be used for cases of nonobvious state involve-
ment,7" was applied in Robinson, a case presenting questions of obvious
involvement, to the exclusion of the other directions in which the concept
has moved is indicative of the confusion surrounding Burton.
Judicial Reluctance and Due Process in the Private University
Assuming arguendo that the Burton test is applicable to Robinson,
the fact that the Fourth Circuit did not find significant indicia of state
involvement7" indicates the extremes to which courts will go to avoid the
subjection of private university disciplinary processes to the due process
clause. Cases involving racial discrimination by private hospitals, which
have found state action from "indicia" similar to that present in most
private universities, seem surprisingly to indicate that the Burton test is
not likely to be used to guarantee due process to private university
students. Additionally, these cases offer a rationale for the judicial reluct-
ance to establish such a guarantee. For example, in Eaton v. Grubbs,"
an action to enjoin a private hospital from denying admission to treat-
ment facilities on a racially discriminatory basis, the Fourth Circuit held
that the record showed that state and federal involvement in the conduct
of the hospital was such to justify a finding of state action." The court,
following the dictates of Burton, weighed such facts as financial aid, a
tax exemption, capital construction subsidies, donations of property, and
the grant of the power of eminent domain to the hospital by the city and
county, before concluding that these facts taken together were sufficient
to invoke the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.',
In Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,2 the court held
that the discriminatory conduct of a hospital which received state-
75447 F.2d at 760 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
7 See note 55 supra.
n365 U.S. at 722.
7 See 447 F.2d at 760 (Butzner, J., dissenting). Judge Butzner in his dissent in Robinson
argued that the Burton test could be applied and would result in a finding of state action.
71329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
"Id. at 715.
WId.; accord, Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir.
1966).
12323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
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distributed funds for construction and modernization constituted state
action pursuant to a state policy of racial discrimination. Another
circuit found that a private hospital, which received fourteen percent of
its budget from government funds and whose board had five members
who were responsible to the public, was infused with state action and
consequently subject to the fourteenth amendment.m
At first glance, the results in the hospital cases, when compared to
Robinson and others, should indicate that the courts are applying the
Burton state action concept to one constitutional right and not to another.
The courts are clearly not as hesitant to apply the equal protection clause
to a racially discriminatory college admissions policy as they are to apply
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to private university
disciplinary proceedings.s In his concurring opinion in Powe v. Miles,
which dealt with an alleged denial of due process by a private college,
Judge Friendly admitted that the result might have been different had the
case involved a racially discriminatory admissions policy. 6 Carrying
Judge Friendly's statement further, the Second Circuit later pointed out
in a due process case that, with respect to racial discrimination, the scope
of state action is somewhat broader. 7 And while state action may be
found in racial discrimination, "where the issue involves the exercise of
First Amendment rights. . . the inquiry must go further." Other courts
have accordingly felt that there is a less demanding standard of what
constitutes sufficient state action where there are allegations of racial
Dld. at 967. For a broader application of Simkins see Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp.
Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969). However, in a due process challenge to a hospital's
firing procedures, one court, after applying Burton, refused to find state action despite the
fact that the hospital received federal construction funds and was subject to state regulation.
Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Mem. Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971).
"Two courts have found state action in equal protection cases involving racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies. Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.
1965), dealt with the discriminatory admissions policy of a college whose establishment had
been made possible by use of surplus city buildings. In Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d
120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968), one of a long line of cases attacking the
racially discriminatory admissions policy of Girard College, the court held that the action
of a city court in removing the city as trustee and naming private individuals in the city's
place was action sufficient to allow a finding of state action.
1407 F.2d at 81.
s'Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soe'y, 445 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971). The court noted
that the reason for further inquiry in first amendment cases than in the area of race
discrimination is that in the latter state inaction or neutrality has often been found to
constitute affirmative encouragement. See FRIENDLY, supra note 16, at 22. See generally
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
1Wolin v. Port Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
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discrimination. s9 The rationale that supports this distinction is drawn
from several sources, including the concept that the state action doctrine
was developed in response to efforts to eliminate private racial discrimi-
nation;90 the racially based origins of the.fourteenth amendment and
section 1983;11 congressional action on the race question in the form of
the various civil rights acts;9 2 and the history of state participation in
racism.9 3 However, Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Association,"
which found state action in a case involving non-racial discrimination,
detracts from the contention that the state action concept is applied to
purely racial situations.95
If courts have a special interest in a particular area, such as racial
discrimination, state action will seemingly be more readily found; the
Supreme Court does not appear to consider the due process problem in
the private university context as one of its special interests. On the other
hand, the Court may be reluctant to confront the problem because of the
sensitive nature of the tenuous public-private university distinction. The
courts recognize that the freedom of choice guaranteed by a dual system
of higher education is "deeply rooted in American tradition"96 and "the
benefits of diversity of educational institutions argue against fitting all
private schools into the same procrustean bed.
'9 7
Whether relying upon a racial discrimination distinction or upon the
self-imposed judicial policy of reluctance in meeting unwelcome issues or
upon the weakness of the state control and public function arguments, the
8"Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff d, 445 F.2d 412
(7th Cir. 1971); see Male v. Crossroads Associates, 320 F. Supp. 141; 148-49 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), in which the district court admitted that the facts before it were very similar to those
in Smith v. Holiday Inns, 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964), but with the significant difference
that, in Smith, there was admitted racial discrimination.
9id.
"See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws",
50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950). For a discussion of the abuses which fostered passage of
the Act of 1871 see Justice Douglas' opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
' 2See Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 94 (1966), suggesting that the Court is reluctant to act in
certain areas without prior Congressional action.
"3See Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Mem. Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
9"413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969). In Sams the Court found that the restriction of staff
privileges to doctors from one county was geographic discrimination and consequently that
doctors from the surrounding counties were denied equal protection.
"5Perhaps the distinction is made in these cases on the basis of any violation of the equal
protection clause and not solely on the basis of racial discrimination.
9"0'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFF. L. REv. 155, 167 (1970).
UDevelopments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1063 (1968).
See also FRIENDLY, supra note 16, at 30.
